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LABOR LAW-INJUNCTION-UNITED STATES v. UNITED MINE
WoRKERs OF AMERICA 1-[This comment was originally prepared as a
discussion of the decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia. Since it seemed probable that the Supreme Court's decision
would be rendered before or shortly after the comment could be published in normal course, the editors decided to delay the printing of
this issue of the Review so that a discussion of the Supreme Court
1 Except as otherwise indicated, the facts relating to the case of United States v.
United Mine Workers of America and John L. Lewis, United States District Court,
District of Columbia, No. 37764, are taken from the findings of fact made and filed
by Judge T. Alan Goldsborough in the contempt proceeding. See 19 L.R.R.M. 2079
(1946); 94 N.Y. TIMES 2:2 (Dec. 4, 1946).
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opinions could be included. References to the opinions of the Supreme
Court Justices appear in brackets.-Ed~] Following a breakdown in
the collective bargaining process in the spring of 1946 between the
majority of the nation's bituminous coal mine operators on the one
hand and the United Mine Workers of America on the other, the
President of the United States, acting under authority of the War
Labor Disputes Act, ordered the Secretary of the Interior to take
possession of the mines where operation was interrupted or threatened with interruption. Pursuant to the order, on May 22, 1946
the United States, through the Secretary of the Interior, took possession of most of the bituminous coal mines of the nation. Subsequently, a contract, embodying changes in wages and other terms
and conditions of employment, was executed by the Secretary of the
Interior, Julius A. Krug, for the government and by the president
of the United Mine Workers, John L. Lewis, for the union. After
approximately :five months of operation under this contract, Lewis
demanded renegotiation, relying on a construction of the contract
which Krug insisted was erroneous. After a series of conferences,
which began on November 1, 1946, the union and the government had
not agreed on the construction of the contract or on any change in the
terms of employment. On November 15, 1946, Lewis issued a unilateral notice of termination of the contract, effective November 20,
in accordance with the construction ·of the contract for which he contended.
On November 18, 1946, the United States, acting through Attorney General Tom Clark, :filed suit in the District Court for the District
of Columbia against the union and Lewis for a declaratory judgment as
to the proper construction of the contract, for temporary injunctive
relief, and for such further relief as µiight be necessary or proper. On
the same day, the court issued an ex parte restraining order based upon
the verified complaint and supporting affidavits of government officials.
The order, as later summarized by the court, commanded that "this
statement that the contract between the union and the Government has
expired should be rescinded"; the other matter in the order w;as regarded as simply ancillary to this·tlirective. 2 Subsequently, upon the
application of the government, the defendants were tried for contempt
of this order and, on December 3, were found to have. "committed a
civil contempt" and to be "guilty of a criminal contempt." On December 4, :fines of $3,500,000 and $10,000 were imposed against the union
and Lewis respectively. 3 On the same day, the government's motion
for a preliminary injunction to replace the temporary restraining order
2

Oral opinion of Judge Goldsborough denying the motion to discharge the rule
to show cause in contempt proceeding. 19 L.R.R.M. 2076 (1946); 94 N.Y. TIMES
2:2 (Nov. 30, 1946).
8
The orders imposing the fines may be found in 19 L.R.R.M. 2086 (1946).
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was granted.4 On December 7, Lewis issued a "back-to-work" order}5
On December 9, the United States Supreme Court granted leave for
a special appeal from the contempt judgments to be heard January 14,
1947.6 Subsequently, the Supreme Court consented to hear argument
as to the applicability of the N orris-LaGuardia Act,7 which may have
indicated a willingness to review the temporary restraining order as well
as the contempt fines. By stipulation a motion to dismiss the application
for a declaratory judgment, then pending in the United States District
Court, and an appeal from the preliminary injunction, then pending
before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,8 were stayed
until ten days after the beginning of arguments in the contempt appeal.0
An attempt to predict the Supreme Court's conclusions in the pending appeal of the contempt judgment is beyond the scope of this comment. Rather, it is proposed at this time only to outline some of the
legal questions involved and to indicate pertinent lines of authority
bearing on these questions. The use of a declaratory judgment in a case
of this sort will not be considered, apart from its possible effect on the
jurisdiction of the court to grant injunctive relief, since the questions
most urgently presented at this early stage relate to the temporary
restraining order, the contempt proceedings and the preliminary injunction. Analysis of the arguments pertinent to the case must necessarily proceed on a point by point basis which may suggest under-emphasis of the overall problem and of the considerations of policy
involved. As to the first of these, we can only recognize that Judge
Goldsborough was confronted with unrelenting economic realities and,
in such a situation, several relatively weak arguments may add up to
more than the sum of their parts. As to the latter, an effort will be
made in the concluding section of this comment to suggest some of the
considerations of policy which remain to be determined, either by judicial or legislative action.
[ On March 6, l 947, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in the case.1 The majority opinion delivered by Chief Justice Vinson,
4

94 N.Y. TIMES
94 N.Y. TIMES
6
94 N.Y. TIMES
1
94 N.Y. TIMES
8
94 N.Y. °:tIMES
9
94 N.Y. TIMES
15

1

1:8
1:8
1 :1
I :1
1:8
I :5

(December 5, 1946).
(December 8, 1946).
(December 10, 1946).
(December 17, 1946).
(December 7, 1946).
(December I 1, 1946).

The statement of the case set forth in the original comment accords substantially
with the statement made by the Supreme Court. It is perhaps significant, in view of
the narrow grounds on which the majority decision as to the applicability of the NorrisLaGuardia Act was laid, that the Court's statement begins, "In October, 1946, the
United States was in possession of, and operating, the major portion of the country's
bituminous coal mines." See the official Advance Opinion of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States (hereinafter referred to as Adv. Op.) in the case of
United States of America v. United Mine Workers of America, Nos. 759, 760, 781,
[
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Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion, Justices Black and Douglas'
opinion concurring in part and· dissenting in part, and Justices Murphy's
and Rutledge's dissenting opinions totalled 126 printed pages. Notwithstanding the involved interplay of ideas in these various opinions,
it is possible to summarize their effect very briefly. A five to four majority, Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, Murphy, and Rutledge dissenting,2 ruled that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not applicable to the
case. The power of the district court to punish for criminal contempt,
even if the Norris-LaGuardia Act had been held to apply, was upheld
by a five to two majority, Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissenting
and Justices Black and Douglas regarding it unnecessary· to consider
the question. Other questions relating to the joint civil-criminal nature
and the procedural aspects of the contempt proceeding were resolved
py a seven to two majority, Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissenting.
A five to four majority, Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge dissenting, sustained the $ ro,ooo fine against Lewis and
$700,000 of the fine against the Mine Workers as being the amount
assessed for the criminal contempt. A six to three majority, Justices
Frankfurter, Murphy, and Rutledge dissenting, considered the remaining $2,800,000 of the fine against the Mine Workers to be the amount
assessed for the civil contempt and conditioned that part of the fine
upon the failure of the Mine Workers to purge the contempt within
five days after the issuance of the Court's mandate. In treating the
Court's decision herein, a brief analysis of the various lines of reasoning
developed by the Court is set out as near the beginning of the discussion of each phase of the case as feasible in an effort to indicate which
parts of the original comment are most pertinent to the Court's decision.
Further analysis is interspersed throughout the original comment as
deemed appropriate.]

I
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE NoRRis-LAGUARDIA AcT
The Norris-LaGuardia Act (hereinafter referred to as the Norris
Act) limits the "jurisdiction" of inferior federal courts to grant injunc782, and Su, October Term, 1946, page 2 of the opinion of the Court. Only a footnote mentioned that "labor disturbances were interrupting the production of bituminous coal" in May of 1946, prior to seizure of the mines by the government. Adv. Op.,
note 1, opinion of the Court.]
2
[
Justices Frankfurter, Murphy and Rutledge each filed separate dissents on the
question of the.applicability of the Norris Act. Justice Murphy joined in the whole
of Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion. Justice Jackson's views were expressed
cryptically at the end of the opinion of the Court, "Mr. Justice Jackson joins in this
opinion except as to the Norris-LaGuardia Act which he thinks relieved the courts of
jurisdiction to issue injunctions in this class of case." Adv. Op., p. 46 of the opinion
of the Court.]
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tive relief in cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute.10 Even
a casual reading of the act reveals that there was no attempt to comply
with its terms in this case. Various of the procedural provisions of the
act were wholly disregarded; the restraining order was issued for ten
days and extended for ten more; 11 no undertaking to indemnify the
defendants was filed prior to the issuance of the restraining order; 12
and no findings of fact were filed prior to the issuance of the restraining
order or the temporary injunction.13 Even more significant, Judge
Goldsborough's decision was in the teeth of section 4, which, if it is
applicable, denied him jurisdiction "to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction ... to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute ... from doing, whether
singly or in concert, any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing
to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment; ...
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud
or violence the acts heretofore specified...." Neither court nor counsel quibbled on this point. Lewis' notice of contract termination was
viewed as tantamount to a cease work or strike notice.14 Thus, the
restraining order issued by the court was improperly granted if the
Norris Act applied to the case.
Section 13 of the Norris Act was obviously designed to preclude
narrow constructions such as had rendered·the anti-injunction clauses
of the Clayton Act almost meaningless. In paragraph (a) it sets forth
two alternative tests for determining whether a case shall be held to
involve or grow out of a labor dispute. The first of these is phrased in
terms of employer and, employee and, standing alone, might leave
some doubt whether a government suit is such a case. But the second
test provides that a case shall be held to involve or grow out of a labor
dispute "when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests
in a 'labor dispute' (as hereinafter defined) of 'persons participating or
interested' therein ( as hereinafter defined)." By paragraph ( c) "the
term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, . . . regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee,"
10
29 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 101-u5. An analysis of the provisions of the act may
be found in 30 MICH. L. REv. 1257 (1932).
11
29 U.S.C. ( l 940) § 107. This section provides that a temporary restraining
order may be issued for a period of five days. Nothing is said about extension of the
order but it would seem clear that the five day limitation should be equally applicable
to extensions of the order and it is even arguable that any extension is contrary to the
spirit, if not the letter, of the Norris Act.
12
29 u.s.c. (1940) § 107.
13
29 u.s.c. (1940) § 109.
14
See the findings of fact filed in the contempt proceeding, § 17. 19 L.R.R.M.
2079 (1946); 94 N.Y. TIMES 2:2 (Nov. 30, 1946).

474

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

a provision into which the Krug-Lewis controversy fits comfortably.15
And both Lewis and the United Mine Workers are "persons participating or interested" in this dispute because it is provided in paragraph
(b) that "a person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it,
and if he or it ••• has a direct or indirect interest therein .••." It would
seem, then, that Judge Goldsborough's decision cannot be sustained on
the ground that the case did not arise out of a labor dispute within the
meaning of section r 3.
But statutes do not always mean what they seem to say ( the legislature's words being only one of the factors in construction) and apy
given case is likely to involve interplay of several statutes and common law principles. When we have found that the terms of the Norris
Act fit the present case, we have merely laid the foundation for examination of the arguments for holding the act inapplicable. These arguments, although taking various forms, prove upon analysis to involve
but two ideas: ( r) This suit is based on later, acts of Congress which
override the Norris Act pro tanto; (2) the Norris Act does not affect
suits brought by the United States.
[Ih ruling that the Norris Act had no application to the Mine,
Workers case, the Supreme Court majority conceded that the case fell
literally within the express terms of section r3 of the act. 8 However,
it was decided that a general principle of statutory construction coupled
with indications in other sections as to the scope of the act and the legis15 Some state courts have adopted the technique of deciding, despite the
same definition of "labor dispute" in state statutes, that a controversy lacking any
merit on the labor side is simply not a labor dispute. Typical of cases in which this
reasoning is employed are those in which the union is striking in breach of contract, or
is s~riking as a minority or "outside" union to compel the employer to bargain in violation of his duty under a labor relations act. See Specific Performance or Injunction as
Proper Remedy for Breach of Collective Bargaining Agreement, Part IV, I 56 A.L.R.
652 at 678 (1945). Such an approach would have much to commend it from the
point of view of legislative policy, but it involves judicial disregard of statutory language
which seems very clear. There was some tendency in early lower federal court decisions
to take the same line under the Norris Act. United Electric Coal Companies v. Rice,
(C.C.A. 7th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 1 at 6, cert. denied, 297 U.S. 714, 56 S. Ct. 590
(1936); criticized in 50 HARV.. L. REV. 1295 at 1300 (1937). However, the Norris
Act was held to prohibit an injunction in a case involving picketing to induce a breach
of a collective bargaining agreement in Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur
Workers Union, (App. D.C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 1, a:ffd., 308 U.s: 522, 60 S. Ct. 78
(1939). The Supreme Court in Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 58 S. Ct.
578 (1938), indicated that the act was to be given a broad construction according to its
letter, and it is hardly to be expected that the Court will take the Lewis case out of the
statute by adopting some qualified definition of the term "labor dispute'! designed to fit
1
. this case.
[ 8 Adv. Op., pp. IO-II of the opinion of the Court.]

'
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lative history of the act compelled the conclusion that the act ·"did not
affect the jurisdiction of the Courts to issue injunctions when sought
by the United States in a labor dispute with its own employees." 4 The
Court then turned to a later act of Congress, the Smith-Connally Act,
to establish that, by virtue of the government seizure of the mines, the
Mine Workers became employees of the federal government. This
line of reasoning suggests that the reader will _be better able to appraise
the Court's decision by reading the two sections of the comment immediately following in reverse order; first, "B. The Effect of Suit Being
Brought by the United States," pages 484-494, infra, and second, "A.
The Effect of Later Acts of Congress," pages 475-484, infra.]

A. The Effect of Later Acts of Congress
Two statutes which were passed subsequent to the Norris Act may
be thought to take this case out of the ambit of the earlier statute,
repealing it insofar as it conflicts with their provisions. A comparison
of these later statutes with the Norris Act is the first order of business
in determining their effect. Subsequently, we shall examine pertinent
lines of judicial authority to evaluate any conflict we may find.
[The Supreme Court majority's analysis of the Norris Act problem
made it unnecessary to decide whether the Smith:..Connally Act effected
a pro tanto repeal of the former act. Proceeding from the conclusion,
reached by independent analysis, that the Norris Act was not intended
to apply to cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute between
the United States and its own employees, it was merely necessary to
decide further that the seizure of the mines made pursuant to the
Smith-Conally Act rriade the miners employees of the United States
for Norris Act purposes, and this the Court majority did. Justices
Frankfurter, Murphy, and Rutledge (and, possibly, Justice Jackson,
who wrote no opinion) took issue with the conclusion that the miners
should be deemed employees of the government, even granting the
exception. None of the opinions even referred to the Declaratory
Judgments Act as a possible factor in the decision on the Norris Act
question.]
·
I.

The pertinent statutes

The Declaratory Judgments Act. The government brought suit
for declaratory judgment on the rights of the parties to the KrugLewis contract, and the injunction was issued to restore the status quo
ante pending determination of these rights and, in the words of Judge
Goldsborough, to insure deliberation "in a calm, judicial atmos(4 Id., p. 2I.]
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phere." 16 While the Declaratory Judgments Act 17 does not specifically
authorize ancillary injunctions, another section of the Judicial Code
empowers federal courts "to issue all writs not specifically provided
for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions." 18 Looking only at these statutes (ignoring for a
moment the Norris Act) it is clear that Judge Goldsborough's injunction could be held "necessary" for the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the Declaratory Judgments Act. 19
What, then, of the collision between these statutes and the Norris
Act? The Declaratory Judgments Act has the advantage of being the
later pronouncement of Congress, but it says nothing whatsoever of injunctions, and the general provision concerning "necessary writs" is
ancient, standing in substantially its present form since 1789.2 ° Furthermore, the Norris Act is more particularized. It provides a detailed code
governing the injunctive remedy in a single class of cases. It would
therefore seem a bit strained to construe the Declaratory Judgments
Act as intended to override the Norris Act. On the contrary, one can
-easily spell out of the three statutes a general authority to issue injunctions in declaratory judgment actions subject, however, to specific limitations in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.
The Smith-Connally Act. The Smith-Connally Act, officially
named the War Labor Disputes Act, is material to the case ( or may
be thought to be material to it) in several ways, but we are at this
moment concerned with only one question; does this later act of Congress take this case out of the ambit of the Norris Act, repealing the
earlier statute pro tanto? The sixth section of the Smith-Connally Act
provides: " (a) Whenever any plant, mine, or facility is in the possession of the United States, it shall be unlawful for any person (I) to
coerce, instigate, induce, conspire with, or encourage any person, to interfere, by lock-out, strike, slow-down, or other interruption, with the
operation of such plant, mine or facility.... No individual shall be
deemed to have violated the provisions of this section by reason only of
16
In the proceedings in the district court, Judge Goldsborough is reported to have
stated that the restraining order was issued "so that for about ten days the question of
-whether Mr. Lewis was right in saying he could cancel the contract or whether Mr.
Krug was right in saying the agreement was for the duration of Government possession
of the mines would be decided in a calm, judicial atmosphere." N.Y. TIMES 1 :8 (Nov.
28, 1946). A similar comment is found in Judge Goldsborough's oral opinion denying
the motion to discharge the rule to show cause in the contempt proceeding. 19
L.R.R.M. 2076 (1946); 94 N.Y. TIMES 2:2 (Nov. 30, 1946).
17
48 Stat. L. 955, § 274d (1934), as amended, 49 Stat. L. 1027, § 405 (1935),
28 u.s.c. (1940) § 400.
18
36 Stat. L. II62, § 262 (1911), 28 U.S.C. (1940) § 377.
19
See Note 53 to 28 U.S.C. (1928) § 377.
20
1 Stat. L. 81 (1789); id. 334 (1793).
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his having ceased to work.... (b) Any person who willfully violates
any provision of this section shall be subject to a fine of not more than
21
$5,000, or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both."
The provision applies to Lewis' denunciation of his contract with Krug,
for Mine Workers' tradition made this pronouncement an effective
strike call. On this point defendants did not dodge or palter. Neither
do we find in the record any suggestion that Lewis was solely responsible. Apparently it was conceded that the United Mine Workers, as an
organization, was equally responsible.
We have already seen that two of the clauses of section 4 of the
Norris Act fit this case, viz., (a) "ceasing to perform any work," and
(i) "inducing without fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified."
If this were a substantive provision, legitimizing the designated conduct, there would be square conflict between the two statutes and the
earlier would yield to the later. But the principal clause of section 4, on
which the nine paragraphs (a) to (i) depend, provides that "no court
of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction ... to prohibit any person ... from doing any of the following acts." Taking these words in
their natural sense, this is not a definition of rights and privileges, but
a restriction on the use of the equitable remedy in the federal courts. 22
And it is not by accident that the statute is so phrased, for Congress has
no power to rewrite the substantive law of tort or crime except within
the fields over which it holds authority under the Constitution, e.g.,
over interstate and foreign commerce. If, now, the Norris Act is read
with the constitutional question in mind, it will be seen that Congress
57 Stat. L. 163 at 165 (1943), 50 U.S.C. (Supp. 1941-1946) Appx. § 1506.
This view of the act is not inconsistent with United States v. Hutcheson, 312
U.S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463 (1941). There, Justice Frankfurter, writing for himself and
three other judges of the Supreme Court (seven sitting) ruled that "whether trade union
conduct constitutes a violation of the Sherman Law is to be determined only by reading
the Sherman Law and § 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct. . . . It would be strange indeed that
although neither the Government nor Anheuser-Busch could have sought an injunction
against the acts here challenged, the elaborate efforts to permit such conduct failed to
prevent criminal liability punishable with imprisonment and heavy fine. . . . 'The
legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has
intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed.
The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that
induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge
of duty for the courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it,
and therefore we shall go on as before.' " Id. at 2 3 l, 2 3 5.
This use of the Norris Act roused a storm of controversy, but we need not consider its soundness. The obvious point is that the decision does not involve any idea
that the Norris Act is not a regulation of procedure: it finds the statute to be something more than a regulation of procedure. Reading it, we must avoid the either-or
fallacy.
21
22
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made no effort to tie the statute to any of its delegated powers except
its -power to control the jurisdiction and procedure of the federal
tourts,2 3 and one cannot doubt that this was a matter of deliberate choice
because it was well known that jurisdiction of the federal courts over
labor cases r~ted either on diversity of citizenship or on federal statutes
tied to other Congressional powers. 2 By making section 4 a regulation
of the injunctive remedy, Congress was able to prevent use of the federal courts to enforce state law or the so-called "federal common law"
that was repugnant to the policy declared in section 2 25 and to restrict
the scope of other federal statutes so -as to effectuate the policy so declared.20
If the Smith-Connally Act provided that violation of section 6
( quoted above) should be subject to injunction, it would be easy
enough to find the Norris Act repealed pro tanto, but there is no reference to injunction anywhere in the later statute. Can we say that, the
Norris Act aside, injunction is an appropriate remedy to enforce the
Smith-Connally Act, wherefore Congress impliedly authorized injunction, with the same effect upon the Norris Act as if injunction had been
expressly authorized? This question raises issues almost identical with
those heretofore considered with respect to the Declaratory Judgments
Act-almost identical, but with the case for implied repeal now weaker
because, the Norris Act aside, it is not easy to spell out equity jurisdiction to enjoin crime.
.
In recent years we have gone far toward making injunctive enforcement of statutes a corollary of criminal sanctions. Growth of this idea
started. in the eighties of the last century, when prohibitionists found
juries unsympathetic and thereupon, with their usual zeal, pushed for
4,

23
See Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, (C.C.A. 2d, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 284,
sustaining statute as exercise of the power of Congress over lower federal courts. As a
regulation of procedure, the act was held applicable to an action commenced before the
statute was passed. Cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595, 55 S. Ct. II0 (1934).
24
FRANKFURTER and GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 5-17 (1930).
25
As pointed out by FRANKFURTER and GREENE, id. at 11 et seq., the federal
courts developed under the head of diversity jurisdiction a body of common law, applicable to labor cases, more or less independent of that unfolded in the state courts;
nonetheless, this federal common law was subject to limitation or change by the legislatures of the several states. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817
(1938), undoubtedly would operate to make the federal "common law'' inapplicable
even without the Norris Act. Wilson & Co. v. Birl, (C.C.A. 3d, 1939) 105 F. (2d)
948, is a square ruling that section 4 operates without reference to the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of defendants' conduct under state law.
26
Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 3II U.S. 91,
61 S. Ct. 122 ( I 940), makes the same point with respect to the interrelation of other
sections of the Norris Act, on the one hand, and the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act, on the other hand. Here the reading of the statute is fortified by reference
. to its history.
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and obtained injunctive enforcement of the ordinances which regulated
the sale of intoxicating beverages. Congress followed this lead with the
injunction clause of the Sherman Act, and now this sort of legislation
is found from coast to coast, in a great variety of applications. 27 Familiarity with this sort of procedure, though founded on statute, has inevitably reshaped lawyers' ideas about criminal equity and helped to
build the conclusion that a court with general equity powers may, at the
suit of the state, enjoin violation of criminal statutes, at least in some
situations.28 Indeed, the counter-revolution has gone so far that if there
were no Norris Act, and the question were whether an injunction could
properly be issued to enforce the Smith-Connally Act, the brief for the
government would be at least as strong as the brief for the Mine
Workers. 29 But there is a Norris Act, and the question is whether injunction has become so far a standard remedy in cases of this kind that
Congress can be taken to have contemplated injunctive enforcement of
the Smith-Connally Act, and therefore can be held to have impliedly
repealed the Norris Act, pro tanto. It seems to us that the negative
answer is inescapable.
·

Judicial authority
We find no authority directly involving the question of a possible
conflict between the Norris Act, on the one hand, and the Declaratory
Judgments Act or the Smith-Connally Act, on the other. However,
there are two lines of cases which offer some analogy, the first involving
collision between the Declaratory Judgments Act and earlier legislation
and the second involving collision between the Norris Act and later
legislation.
First, there may be noted a line of decisions involving suit for declaratory judgment in a federal court with an application for injunction against actions in a state court. This brings in the Declaratory
2.

27

45 HARV. L. REv. 1096 ( l 93 2) collects such statutes.
Lewis, "A Protest against Administering the Criminal Law by Injunction-the
Debs Case," 33 AM. L. REG. (N.S.) 879 (1894); Dunbar, "Government by Injunction," 13 L. Q. R. 347 at 353 (1897); Mack, "Revival of Criminal Equity," 16
HARV. L. REV. 389 (1903); Chafee, "Progress of the Law, 1919-1920," 34 HARV.
L. REv. 388 at 401-407 (1921), comment on coal strike injunction of 1919; 32 YALE
L. J. 166 (1922); 13 CALL. REV. 63 (1924).
29
In labor cases, especially, the courts appear to have been willing to allow injunctive enforcement of statutes in which only criminal sanctions were specifically
authorized, perhaps because these cases are laid in a context which emphasized the
economic implications, rather than the criminal aspects, of the defendant's conduct.
Illustrative of this tendency are Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of
Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 427 (1930), and Virginian
Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 57 S. Ct. 592 (1937), in
which injunctive relief was granted although it was based in part on provisions of the
Railway Labor Act for which criminal enforcement was provided.
28
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Judgments Act, as does the Mine Workers case, but the place of the
Norris Act is taken by the old provision of the Judicial Code that "the
writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United
States to stay proceedings in any court of a state. . . ." 80 Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. was a case of this type; there
the Supreme Court held that the anti-injunction statute controlled.81
This situation is not exactly analogous to the one presented to Judge
Goldsborough but the difference is such that it favors the Mine Workers. The Norris Act is much more particularized than the old statute
forbidding injunction against proceedings in state courts, -wherefore it
more insist½ntly demands primacy over the Declaratory Judgments Act
and the "necessary writs" statute.
A second analogy may be found in cases in which the Norris Act has
come into collision with the bankruptcy statutes and has come out
second best. The problem has arisen as to the authority of the bankruptcy court to prevent interferences by labor organizations with its
control of the bankrupt's property. In one instance, the decision was
grounded, insofar as pertinent here, on the particularity of provisions
in the Chandler Act with reference to the rights of employees of the
trustee which indicated that "if Congress intended to curtail the bankruptcy power where the threatened destruction of property within its
jurisdiction was related to a labor dispute, it would have said so ...." 82
And in another, the court based its conclusions on the ground (among
others) that injunction was not really necessary; "when the petition is
approved by the court and it continues the officers of the corporation
in possession of the property, it is in the custody of the court and it is
not competent for any person to interfere with the possession of the
corporate officers without first obtaining its consent." 33
The force of these decisions in the Mine Workers case would seem
to be weakened by the fact that they arose in proceedings deriving expressly from the bankruptcy statutes whereas the Smith-Connally Act
is applicable to the principal case only by implication if at all. On the
other hand, it would necessarily be granted that the Smith-Connally
8

° Code§ 265, 28 U.S.C.A.

(1928) § 379, derived from an act of 1793.
.
3 12 U.S. 2 70, 61 S. Ct. 51o ( I 94 I) • See, also, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Yeatts, (C.C.A. 4th, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 665; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Consumer's
Finance Service, (C.C.A. 3d, 1938) IOI F. (2d) 514; Central Surety & Insurance Co.
v. •Norris, (C.C.A. 5th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) I r6. That the contrary view is not absurd,
is indicated by Pacific Fire Insurance Co. v. C. C. Anderson Co., (D.C. Idaho 1942)
. 42 F. Supp. 917, where, overlooking the decisions above cited, the anti-injunction
statute was held inapplicable.
82 In re Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing Co., (D.C. Ohio 1935) II F. Supp. 198
at 207.
33 Converse v. Highway Construction Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 127
at 130.
31
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Act is even more specific than the Chandler Act as to the rights and
privileges of employees of government-possessed property. However,
the crucial point lies in a comparison of the idea of judicial possession
in a bankruptcy or reorganization proceeding with that of administrative possession under the Smith-Connally Act. A strong tradition
permits a court in control of property to protect its possession as an
inherent function of the judicial power. 34 Add to these factors extensive
adverse criticism of these decisions 35 and it would seem that they provide little more than a possible, but tenuous, argument for implied
repeal of the Norris Act by the Smith-Connally Act.
[ The Supreme Court's opinions took varying cognizance of the
Smith-Connally Act. In the course of these treatments of the act, its
legislative history was regarded as significant. Consequently, a recapitulation of that history serves as a sound point of departure in the further
analysis of the effect of the Smith-Connally Act on the Norris Act.
The following from Justice Frankfurter's opinion serves admirably for
this purpose:
" ... As reported out of the Senate Committee, S. 796 provided for plant seizure. It did not include the injunction among
the remedies for interference with Government operation. But
when the Bill reached the floor of the Senate, Senator Connally,
sponsor of the Bill, offered and urged an amendment giving the
district courts jurisdiction to restrain violations of the measure... .
this proposal was rejected by the Senate after full debate... .
With this remedy denied to the Government, the Bill was passed
and sent to the House. The House did hot like the Bill. . . . the
House version provided stringent anti-strike and anti-lockout
provisions as to plants in private operation, and by specific amendment to the Norris-LaGuardia Act the district courts 'were authorized to restrain violations of such provisions. But this pro tanto
repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was not made available to the
United States as a remedy against interference with operation of
plants seized under the earlier, 1940 Act.
"The bill then went to conference. What came out was, so far
as here material, the bill that had passed the Senate. . . . Specific
remedies were formulated by Congress against interference with
the Government's operation. The injunction was not included.
34
One might argue that the policy of the Norris Act is equally applicable to control of strike activities by the doctrine of judicial possession, a sort of implied injunction,
but this argument is not very convincing. The framers of the Norris Act did not choose
simply to declare a general policy. They carefully and meticulously dealt with the labor
injunction, and that only.
85
See notes, 35 CoL. L. REv. 1140 (1935); 49 HARV. L. REv. 341 (1935); 45
YALE L. J. 372 (1935).
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•••. On the floor of the Senate, Senator Thomas of Utah, Chair-.
man of the Committee on Education and Labor, said: 'Mr. President, I ask the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Hatch], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dannaher ], and the Senator from
Texas [Mr. Connally], the sponsor of the bill, whether there is a
unanimous opinion on the part of those three great lawyers that
there will not be a reopening of the district courts to industrylabor disputes? ... I should like that point to be made so firmly
and so strongly that no lawyer in the land who would like to take
advantage of the situation cre·ated by the mere mention of the
words "district court" will resort to the court in order to confuse
our industry-labor relation.' Mr. Conn.ally a~swered: 'Mr. President, •.. I think I speak for the Senator from Vermont and the
Senator from New Mexico and the Senator from Connecticut and
also the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Van Nuys], although he is
not present, when I say there is no jurisdiction whatever conferred
by this bill providing for resort to the United States district court,
except the one mentioned by the Senator from Connecticut, which
is merely the right to go there for a civil action for damages, and no
jurisdiction whatever is given over labor disputes. Does that answer the Senator?' .•• Under these circumstances the Bill became
law, and the seizure giving rise to this controversy was made
under that law." 5 ]
[The majority of,the Court regarded the views of the legislators
that the Norris Act applied to cases growing out of or involving labor
disputes in government seized facilities as having little or no bearing
on the question of legislative intent in enacting the earlier Norris
Act. 6 Nor were such views accorded any weight as an indication that
the Smith-Connally Act itself.was restrictive of the equity jurisdiction
' of federal courts.7 With that, the legislative history as it pertained to
the relationship of the Norris Act and the Smith-Connally Act was put
aside, and the Court proceeded to an examination of the status of employees in government seized facilities, utilizing the express language
of the Smith-Connally Act 8 and the actual relationship of the parties to
5

Id., pp. 16-19 of the opinion of Justice Frankfurter. The exchange between
Senator Thomas and Senator Conally appears in 89 CoNG. REc. 5754 (1943). Other
passages cited either by Justice Frankfurter or by the Court give rise to the view that
the legislators regarded the Norris Act as applicable to a case growing out of or involving a labor dispute in which employee's.of a plant seized by the govermµent were concerned. See 89 CoNG. REc. 3897, 3906, 3907, 3984, 3985, 3986, 3988, 3989,
5241, 5243, 5299, 5205, 5321, 5325 (1943).]
6
[
Adv. Op., pp. 19-21 of the opinion of the Court.]
[7 Id., pp. 23-24.]
8
[
Id., pp. 23-24. The Court cited a statement by Senator Connally on the .fioor
of the Senate that "when we do take it over, it is a Government plant, just as much as
,

[
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the Krug-Lewis agreement 9 to support the conclusion that they were,
for the purposes of this case, employees of the federal government.]
[Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion, said that even if
the Norris Act was not intended to apply to labor disputes involving
"employees" of the United States (which he denied), "the relation of
the miners to the United States is a hybrid one" and, viewed in the
light of the legislative history of the Smith-Connally Act, not such as
to place them within the Court's "interpolated exception." 10 Justice
Rutledge concurred wholeheartedly in Justice Frankfurter's view and
added the further comment that the Smith-Connally Act must be considered in its context as a temporary war measure designed to provide
sanctions exclusive of the injunctive remedy to meet the problems immediately at hand.11 ]
[Justice Murphy, having joined in Justice Rutledge's opinion,
added that government seizure of the coal mines was irrelevant to the
issue. He said:
"But when all is said and done, the obvious fact remains that
this case i~volves and grows out of a labor dispute between the
operators and the miners. Government seizure of the mines cannot hide or change that fact .... To permit the Government to
obtain an injunction wh.ere there has been a seizure would equally
fl.out the language and policy of the [Norris] Act. In whatever
capacity the Government acts, this statute closes the doors of the
federal courts where a restraining order or injunction is sought in
a case arising out of private labor dispute." 12 ]
[The views of the minority Justices are well summarized thus:
"The Senate, and at the end the Congress, were not declining expressly
to authorize labor injunctions only to turn squarely about and nullify
that refusal in the same breath, merely by virtue of the fact that the employees of the seized plants necessarily were made subject temporarily
to ultimate governmental operat_ing direction and control." 18 What
if we had a fee simple title to it. • . ." 89 CoNG. REc. 38n-3812 (1943). The
criminal penalties provided for interference with the operation of seized facilities and
the procedures for adjusting wages and conditions of employment were accorded
significance in supporting this view.]
9
[
Adv. Op., pp. 25-28 of the opinion of the Court. The Court attached special
importance to the collective bargaining relationship between the government and the
Mine Workers. "It is descriptive of the situation to state that the Government, in
order to maintain production and accomplish the purposes of the seizure, has substituted
itself for the private employer in dealing with those matters which formerly were the
subject of collective bargaining between the union and the operators." Id., p. 26. Cf.
Id., pp. 2-3 of the opinion of Justice Black and Justice Douglas.]
[1° Id., pp. 13-21 of the opinion of Justice Frankfurter.]
[ 11 Id., pp. 2- 1 o of the opinion of Justice Rutledge.]
[ 12 Id., pp. 3-4 of the opinion of Justice Murphy.]
18
[
Id., pp. 4-5 of the opinion of Justice Rutledge.]
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has been said in the original comment with regard to any supposed
-conflict between the Norris Act and the Smith-Connally Act supports
this view.]

B. The Effect of Suit Being Brought by the United States
The Supreme Court has expressed itself in United States v.
Hutcheson 36 to the effect that the Norris Act applies to suits brought
by the United States. This case involved a criminal prosecution under
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. In developing the reasoning by which
the Norris Act was given the substantive effect of rejuvenating section
20 of the Clayton Act so as to take certain allegedly criminal acts out
of the ambit of the Sherman Act, 31 Justice Frankfurter, writing the
majority opinion, stated: "It would be strange indeed that although
neither the Government nor Anheuser-Busch could have sought an
injunction against the acts here challenged, the elaborate efforts to permit such conduct failed to prevent criminal liability punishable with
imprisonment and heavy fines." 38 Although the decision of the court
turned in part, at least, on ·this proposition, the statement was made
without •further analysis or citation of authority. 39 Neither the concurring nor the dissenting opinions took issue with the statement that the
government was not entitled to injunctive relief. However, the
Hutcheson case can be distinguished from the Mine Workers case.
In. the Hutcheson case the question was whether the defendants' acts
were criminal and the Norris Act was used as an aid in interpreting and
effectuating the policy expressed in section 20 of the Clayton Act; in
the Mine Workers case, the defendants' acts were expressly made
criminal by the Smith-Connally Act and the Norris Act would be used
as a limitation on the policy so declared. In addition, it must be recognized that the Hutcheson case involved only a private labor dispute
whereas the United Mine Workers case involved government possessed property. Whether these differences are significant can be determined only by an analysis of pertinent policy factors which are to be
considered briefly in the concluding section of this comment.
[The Supreme Court did consider the Mine Workers case to be
distinguishable from the Hutcheson case upon the ground that the latter case involved an injunction sought by the United States and directed
36

312 U.S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463 (1941).
Supra, note 22.
38
312 U.S. 2-19 at 235.
39
Lower cqurt decisions to the same effect may be found in United States v.
Wierton Steel Co., (D.C. Del. 1934) 7 F. Supp. 255; United States v. Am. Fed. of
Musicians, (D.C. Ill. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 304, affd., 318 U.S. 741, 63 S. Ct. 665
(1943).
37
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to persons not employees of the United States.14 The distinction followed upon the Court's holding that the Norris Act did not withdraw
the government's pre-existing right to seek injunctive relief against its
own employees. This in turn derived (I) from the canon of statutory
construction that the sovereign is not bound by statutes of general application unless expressly named ( as indicated hereinafter this principle
would appear to be equally applicable to the Hutcheson situation),
(2) from an analysis of the structure and language of the Norris Act,
and (3) from the legislative history of the act. Justice Frankfurter took
express exception to each of these steps in the majority's reasoning.
Justice Murphy, on the other hand, was apparently willing to concede
that the Norris Act has no application to cases involving a labor dispute
between the federal government and its bona fide employees and concentrated his attack on the absence of a genuine employer-employee relationship between the government and the miners. 15 Justice Rutledge
concurred in general terms with Justice Frankfurter but it is not clear
to what extent he supported Justice Frankfurter's reasoning in these
particulars.10 The approach adopted in the original comment considers
each of the arguments adopted in the opinion of the Court. Further
analysis of the Court's reasoning follows immediately after each of the
next three sub-sections of the original comment.]
The structure of the Norris Act
We have already seen that the Mine Workers case is probably within
section 13 of the Norris Act which defines a case involving or growing
out of a labor dispute. However, there is some indication in the general structure of the act that it was intended to apply only to suits by
private persons. For example, section 7 requires that before an injunction may be issued the court must find that "the public officers
charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are unable or
unwilling to furnish adequate protection," and notice of the hearing
must be given to such public officers. This reference to state police
protection of property interests raises some doubt whether those who
I.

14

Adv. Op., p. 19 of the opinion of the Court.]
Id., pp. 2-4 of the opinion of Justice Murphy. "The whole thrust of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is directed toward the use of restraining orders and injunctions
in cases arising out of labor disputes between private employers and employees."
Id., p. 2.]
[ 16 Id., pp. 2, IO of the opinion of Justice Rutledge. The views of Justice Rutledge do not preclude the interpretation placed on the Norris Act by the majority, since
he concerned himself primarily with the effect of the Smith-Connally Act on the case.
This throws some doubt on the extent of his endorsement of Justice Frankfurter's_ views,
particularly when it is remembered that Justice Murphy joined in Justice Rutledge's
opinion. See note [ I 5], supra.]
[

[

15
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drafted the act were thinking of suits to protect broad public interests.
The filing of an undertaking by complainant and surety to indemnify
defendant, as required by the same section in the case of temporary
restraining orders and temporary injunctions, likewise seems peculiarly
appropriate to private complainants. Section 8, requiring the complainant to make every reasonable efl;ort to settle the dispute by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of
mediation or voluntary arbitration, seems inapplicable to suits in which
the government is intervening in a dispute between private persons and
of doubtful applicability to suits in which the government is directly
involved in a labor dispute. Finally, section 13 itself refers to "employers" in a general third-person sense and not as though Congress
intended to include the government as employer.40 However, keeping
in mind the fact that the purpose of the act is to limit the jurisdiction
of courts in specified kinds of cases and not to define the rights of
specified complainants, it is doubtful that these arguments could serve
as more than makeweight.
[The Supreme Court majority attached considerable importance to
some of the language in the Norris Act, regarding it as inapplicable to
the government as an employer or to the relations between the government and its employees.11 Emphasis was placed upon the policy stated
in section 2 of the act. "It predicates the purpose of the Act on the contrast between the position of the 'individual organized worker' and that
of the 'owners of property' who have been permitted to 'organize in the·
corporate and other forms of ownership association,' arid on the consequent helplessness of the worker 'to exercise actual liberty of contract
... and ther.eby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment."' 18 The use of the word "person" in section 13 was thought to
be inappropriate to the·federal government, as was some of the other
language in the same section.19 Finally, significance was attached to the
finding required by section 7, as a condition precedent to the issuance
of an injunction, that the public officers charged with the duty to pro40

The government is specifically excluded from the term "employer" in the
Wagner Act. 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 152(2).

[17 Adv. Op., pp. 12-15 of the opinion of the Court.]
18

Id., p. 13.]
Id., pp. 14-15. The other language to which the court referred was that used
in the definition of a "person participating or interested in a labor dispute" in section
13 (b) and also used in the first alternative test of whether a case is one involving or
growing out of a labor dispute in section 13(a). As pointed out in the original comment, pp. 473-474, supra, the second alternative test set out in section 13(a) uses no language appropriate to an employer-employee relationship; it would be sufficient that the
party against whom relief was sought was a person participating or interested in a labor
dispute. And see, Adv. Op., pp. 7-8 of the opinion of Justice Frankfurter, wherein the
view is taken that the "qualifications" of the first alternative test in section 13(a) do not
take the Mine Workers case outside the terms of that test.]
[
[

19
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tect complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate
protection.]
[Justice Frankfurter argued that neither the context nor the content
of the Norris Act qualifies the terms of section I 3 (a).
"'!'he title of the Act gives its scope and purpose, and the terms
of the Act justify its title. It is an Act 'to define and limit the
jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity.' It does not deal with the
rights of parties but with the power of the courts. Again and again
the statute says 'no court shall have jurisdiction,' or an equivalent
phrase. Congress was concerned with the withdrawal of power
from the federal courts to issue injunctions in a defined class of
cases. Nothing in the Act remotely hints that the withdrawal of
this power turns on the character of the parties. The only reference to parties underscores their irrelevance to the issue of jurisdiction, for the power of the courts is withdrawn in a labor
dispute 'regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.' The limitation on
the jurisdiction of the court depends entirely on the subject matter of the controversy." 20 ]
[As indicated in the original comment, the argument on the language of the act cannot be very persuasive, taken alone. The majority
regarded it as indicating the appropriateness of its view that the general
principle of statutory construction next to be discussed should be applied.]
2. Implied exclusion of the sovereign
Judge Goldsborough found support for his conclusion that the
Norris Act does not apply to suits brought by the United States in the
general rule that "the state is not bound by the provisions of any statute,
however generally it may be expressed, by which its sovereignty would
be derogated from, or any of its prerogatives, rights, titles, or interests would be divested, save where the act is specifically made to extend to the state, or where the legislative intention in that regard is too
plain to be mistaken." 41 Judge Goldsborough cited Dollar Savings
Bank v. United States 42 as the leading American case on the subject; 48
[2° Id., p. 7 of the opinion of Justice Frankfurter.]
41

BLACK, INTERPRETATION OF LAws, 2d ed., 95 (1911). See also CRAWFORD,
STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTioN, § 244 (1940) and HARDCASTLE, STATUTE LAw, 3d ed.,
c. 6, p. 199 (1901).
42
19 Wall. (86 U.S.) 227 (1873). The decision in the case is weakened by the
fact that the result c.ould have been reached without reliance on the sovereignty exclusion doctrine, as recognized by the court itself-"but all this is superfluous••••" id.
at 240.
48
See the opinion denying John L. Lewis' motion to dismiss contempt charges
against him, text reported in 94 N. Y. TIMES 2:2 (Nov. 30, 1946).
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but the most commonly quoted judicial statement of the doctrine is that
of Justice Clifford in United States v. Herr9n: "Where an act of
Parliament is made for the public good, as for the advancement of religion and justice, or to prevent injury and wrong, the king is bound
by such act, though not particularly named therein; but where a statute
is general, and thereby any prerogative, right, title, or interest is divested or taken from the king, in such case the king is not bound, unless
the statute is made to extend to him by express words." 44 Accordingly,
a statute may be applicable to the government without an express declaration to that effect. "The canon of construction t~at a sovereign is
presumptively not; intended to be bound by its own sta,tutes unless
named therein, like all canons of construction, is merely an aid in arriving at legislative intent, and the presumption raised by it is not
conclusive." 45 "The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to
construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to
bring state or nation within the scope of the law." 46
The Supreme Court has recognized a specific exception to this canon
of construction in that "a statute drawn in general terms will be construed to bind the sovereign when the burden or injury which the act
seeks to avoid may be imposed or inflicted by the sovereign as well as
, by private individuals." 47 The decision in Nardone v. United States
that the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, prohibiting
wire-tapping, applied to federal agents was based upon this principle
that the sovereign is embraced by general words of a statute intended
to prevent injury and wrong.48 The Norris Act was the result_of a long
fight against the wrong of "government by injunction." 49 :;ind was
designed to prevent irreparable injury to labor through the improvident issue of ex parte restraining orders. Injunctions issued at the request of the government figured prominently in the history of labor
injunctions which forms the background for the Norris Act. In 1894 a
44

20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 251 at 255 (1873).
40 Op. Atty. Gen., No. 18, p. I (1941).
46
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 at 605, 61 S. Ct. 742 (1940).
47
40 Op. Atty. Gen., No. 18, pp. 1, 2 (1941); United States v. California, 297
U.S. 175, 56 S. Ct. 421 (1936).
48
302 U.S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275 (1937). See, also, United States v. Knight, 14
Pet. (39 U.S.) 301 (1840); United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 251
(1873); Umthun v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 235 Iowa 298, 16 N.W. (2d) 238
(1944). United States v. Hoar, (C.C. Mass. 1821) 2 Mason 3II at 314( is to the
effect that the government is not included within the terms of a general statute unless it
is "clear from the nature of the mischief to be redressed, or the language used, that the
government itself was in contemplation of the legislature...."
49 A slogan used by the Democratic Party in 1896 in its campaign against the
abuse of labor injunctions. FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION I
45
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strike against tne Pullman Company which paralyzed transportation
throughout the nation was ended by a federal court injunction issued
upon the application of the United States. The decision of the Supreme
Court 50 upholding this injunction has been described as "one of the
datum posts in American legal history," and aroused wide public discussion and bitter protest among labor elements.51 In 1922, operation
of railroads throughout the country was halted by a strike of railway
shopmen. This strike was ended by the much-discussed Wilkerson injunction, also issued in a suit by the federal government.52 This injunction, too, "is a landmark in the history of American equity," 58 and was
the subject of considerable debate during the consideration of the
Norris Act in Congress.54 The alleged abuses of the labor injunction,
therefore, had occurred in government as well as private litigation and
the statute could have been intended as a general corrective. ·
Another exception to the general canon is that the sovereign is
bound by statutes which lay down general rules of procedure in civil
actions. The Supreme Court in the decision of Green v. United States
said: "We see no reason why . . . [ such statutes] should not be applied
to trials in which the United States are a party, as well as those between
private persons .... It is urged that the government is not bound by a
law unless expressly named. We do not see why this rule of construction should apply to acts of legislation which lay down general rules of
procedure in civil actions." 55
[The majority opinion of the Supreme Court stated: "There is
an old and well-known rule that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect." 21 The Court then
acknowledged the cases which pointed out that this was a rule of
construction only and ought not to be indiscriminately applied, but
pointed out that "the rule has been invoked successfully in cases so
closely similar to the present one, and the statement of the rule in
those cases has been so explicit, that we are inclined to give it weight
here." 22 ]
110

51

Jn re Debs, Petitioner, 158 U.S. 564, 15 S. Ct. 900 {1895).
2 WARREN, THE SUPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 700-702

(1937).
52

United States v. Railway Employees' Dept., A.F.L., (D.C. 111. 1922) 283 F.

479.
FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 103 (1930).
See note 69, infra.
55
9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 655 at 658 {1869). See also State ex rel. Hamilton v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 190 Wash. 496, 68 P. {2d) 1031 (1937).
GS
114

[
[

21
22

Adv. Op., pp. II-12 of the opinion of the Court.]
Id., p. 12.]

49°
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"It is one thing to read a statute so as not to bind the sovereign
by restrictions, or to impose upon it duties which are applicable to
ordinary citizens. It is quite another to interpolate into a statute
limiting the jurisdiction of a· court,the qualification that such funitation does not apply when the Government invokes the jurisdiction. No decision of this Court gives countenance to such a doctrine
of interpolation." 28 ]
•
[The Dollar Savings Bank, American Bell Telephone Co., and
Stevenson cases,2" cited by Chief Justice Vinson as closely similar to the
Mine Workers case, insofar as the principle of implied exclusion of the
sovereign is concerned, were all decided prior to 19ro. In the Dollar
Savings Bank case the argument was made that a federal tax statute,
which provided for enforcement by distraint, could not be enforced by
an action for debt since, under state law then applicable, the action of
debt did not lie to recover a tax authorized by a statute providing another remedy in specific terms. Thi.s argument was rejected on two
grounds: (I) the sovereign was not bound by an implied exclusion of
other remedies although tax collectors and other officers and agents
would be, and ( 2) the statute specifically authorized suit by the sovereign "in any proper form of action." 25 In the American Bell Telephone Co. case the statute provided that judgments or decrees of the
circuit courts of appeals should be final in all cases arising under the
patent laws. The United States was permitted an appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that the suit, which was instituted to revoke
a patent, was not within the policy of the statute and the principle of
implied exclusion of the sovereign therefore applied. The Stevenson
case arose under a statute which specifically authorized only a civil
suit to collect the statutory penalty for unlawfully assisting the immigration of alien laborers. The United States was held entitled to pro-·
ceed by criminal indictment upon the theory that the sovereign was not
bound by the implied exclusion of other remedies.]
[The Dollar Savings Bank and Stevenson cases could be distinguished from the Mine Workers case upon the ground that the prohibition of the remedies sought was implied instead of provided by
express prov_isions of statute. The American Bell Telephone Co. case
appears to be more nearly analogous. · The Court made no mention of
the Nardone case, discussed in the original comment,26 which seems to
28

Id., p. 8 of the opinion of Justice Frankfurter.]
Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. (86 U.S.) 227 (1873);
United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 159 U.S. 548, 16 S. Ct. 35 (1909);
United States v. Stevenson, 215 U.S. 190, 30 S. Ct. 35 (1909).]
25
(
See footnote 42 of the original commerit.]
26
(
See page 488, supra.]
.(
[

2
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carry contrary implications. Moreover, as suggested by Justice Frankfurter, the recent case of United States v. Rice 21 which held that the
United States, although not expressly mentioned, was bound by a
statutory provision denying appeal from a refusal of a federal district
court to remove a case from a state court, was not mentioned in the
Court's opinion.]
[ A further point made by Justice Frankfurter is perhaps more
significant than the above analysis of case authority. The doctrine of
implied exclusion of the sovereign, applied to the Norris Act, would
render the act inapplicable in all cases in which the United States appeared as complainant as well as in the class of cases, actually found
excepted from the act, in which the United States is also the employer. "Moreover, the rule proves too much. If the United States
must explicity be named to be affected, the limitations imposed by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act upon the district court's jurisdiction could not
deprive the United States of the remedies it theretofore had. Accordingly, the courts would not be limited in their jurisdiction when the
United States is a party and the act would not apply in any proceeding
in which the United States is complainant." 28 ]

3. Legislative history and intent
Ordinarily, resort to legislative records as an aid to construction
of a statute is had only when the statute is ambiguous or doubtful in
meaning.116 It may be questioned, as heretofore indicated, whether the
Norris Act contains any ambiguity as to its applicability to the case
where the United States is the petitioner. For present purposes, however, such ambiguity will be assumed. In ruling that the Norris Act did
not apply to the case before him, Judge Goldsborough relied in part
on his recollection (having been a member of the 72nd Congress which
passed the act) that certain amendments which would have excepted
cases where the United States is the petitioner from the operation of the
act were rejected because "the language of the act did not apply to the
Government." 57 The amendments to which Judge Goldsborough referred were offered in the House of Representatives by.Mr. Beck of
Pennsylvania and Mr. Blanton of Texas.
Mr. Beck's amendment would have added a proviso to section r
[
[

27
28

56

327 U.S. 742, 66 S. Ct. 835 (1946).]
Adv. Op., p. 9 of the opinion of Justice Frankfurter.]

BLAcK, INTERPRETATION OF LAws, 2d ed., §§ 24-27, 90 (1911); CRAWFORD,
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES,§§ 158, 209 (1940).
57
Oral opinion denying defendants' motion to dismiss contempt charges, United
States v. United Mine Workers and John L. Lewis, No. 37764, United States District
Court, District of Columbia. Reported in full in 94 N.Y. TIMES 2:2 (Nov. 30, 1946);
19 L.R.R.M. 2076 (1946).
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of the act making that section and all subsequent sections inapplicable
to cases involving a labor dispute which suspends or discontinues a public utility essential to the property, health and lives of the people of any
state or community or which obstructs any instrumentality of interstate
or foreign commerce.58 Mr. LaGuardia of New York made the point
of order that the amendment was not germane, stating that "the bill
refers only to disputes between employers and employees" but going
on to say that the "public is fully protected by penal and other statutes
not intended to be repealed by this bill." 59 The Chair ruled that "the
amendment ... excepts ... cases where the welfare and health of the
public are concerned." 60 The amendment was rejected, I 55 to 63.61
Mr. Blanton's amendment would have inserted the phrase, "except
where the United States Government is the petitioner," at the beginning of section I of the act. 62 · Mr. LaGuardia stated that the bill was
inapplicable to the United· States because the United States was not
within the definition of a person or association in section I 3 (b) of the
act. 63 The amendment was rejected 125 to 2I. 6 "
In a previous exchange upon the specific question here involved,
Mr. LaGuardia had argued that the objections raised by Mr. Beck
did not require the use of the injunction as a remedy; they were amply
taken care of by criminal penalties. 05 Against the somewhat confusing
· tenor of Mr. LaGuardia\; statements, must be set the clear insistence
of Mr. Beck and Mr. Blanton that the injunctive remedy would be
unavailable to the government unless their amendments were accepted.
From this much alone it is difficult to draw any definite conclusion as to
the legislative intent.
Apart from the comments by Mr. LaGuardia, Mr. Michener
of Michigan suggested that the act would be inapplicable to cases where
the United States is the petitioner.66 There was no discussion of this
point in the Senate and the reports of both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees are silent on the question. 67 When President Hoover
signed the bill, he called specific attention to a memorandum opinion
58

,75 CoNG. REc. 5503 (1932).
lbid.
60 Id. 5504.
61 Id. 5505.
62 Id. 5503.
63
Ibid. As heretofore indicated, this fact would not remove cases in which the
United States is the petitioner from the application of the Norris Act. See also Witte,
"The Federal Anti-Injunction Act," 16 MINN. L. REv. 638 at 642, note II (1932).
However, this remark may still be significant if it expressed the intent of Congress.
G<1 75 CoNG. REc. 5503 (1932).
65
Id. 5480.
66
Id. 5464.
67
H. Rep. 669, 72d Cong., 1st sess.; S. Rep. 163, pts. I & 2, 72d Cong., 1st sess.
59
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of Attorney General Mitchell which expressed the conclusion that the
Norris Act did not forbid "the maintenance by the United States of
suits to enjoin unlawful conspiracies or combinations under the anti-trust
laws to outlaw legitimate articles of interstate commerce." 68 However,
repeated references to government injunction suits on the floor of Congress during the course of the debates show that many legislators
thought they were restricting the jurisdiction of the inferior federal
courts in all cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute. 69
Obviously, it cannot be said that every member of Congress understood
the bill to be restricted to suits by private parties, and it is not easy to
say that they should so have understood it. It seems highly doubtful
that an exception as to suits brought by the United States can justifiably
be written into the act on the basis of this legislative background.
[ The opinion of the Court concedes that the reference in both
Houses of Congress "to previous instances in which the United States
had resorted to the injunctive process in labor disputes between private
employers and private employees ... indicate that Congress, in passing
the Act, did not intend to permit the United States to continue to intervene by injunction in purely private labor disputes." 29 However, in
establishing the narrower exception as to suits brought by the United
States for injunctive relief in disputes with its own employees, the
Court regarded the comments of Mr. LaGuardia, in opposing Mr.
Blanton's amendment, and of Mr. Michener as especially significant.
"Representatives Michener and LaGuardia were members of
the Judiciary Committee which reported and recommended the
bill to the House. They were the most active spokesmen for the
Committee, both in explaining the bill and advocating its passage .
. . . We cannot but believe that the House accepted these authori68
See Witte, "The Federal Anti-Injunction Act," 16 MINN. L. REV. 638 at 642
(1932); 30 M1cH. L. REv. 1257, note 51 (1932).
69
The injunction issued at the request of the federal government by Judge Wilkerson in United States v. Railway Employees' Dept. A.F.L., supra, note 52, was vigorously attacked in the Senate. Senator Blaine termed it "as harsh as possibly could be
conceived" and expressed the view that it contributed largely to the bitter feeling of
labor in regard to injunctions issued by federal courts. 75 CoNG. REc. 4619-4620
(1932). Senator Walsh referred to this injunction as an example of the evils of issuing
ex parte restraining orders on affidavits. Id. at 4693. Senator Robinson remarked that
Judge Wilkerson and the United States Attorney General seemed to have "decided
that the strike ought to be terminated and that the power of the Government ought to
be employed to end the strike," in disregard of Congressional policy against compulsory arbitration in such cases. Id. at 5001. Representative LaGuardia cited the Wilkerson injunction as an example of the abuses the Norris Act was designed to prevent.
Id. at 5479. Representative Cellar contended, finally, that the Wilkerson injunction
"verily destroyed the bill of rights contained in our Constitution." Id. at 5490.

[

29

Adv. Op., p.

I

6 of the opinion of the Court.]
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tative representation~ as to the proper construction of the bill. The
Senate expressed no· contrary understanding, and we must conclude that Congress, in passing the Act, did not intend to withdraw
the Government's existing rights to injunctive relief against its
own employees." 30 ]
[Justice Frankfurter criticised the construction placed upon the remarks of Mr. LaGuardia and Mr. Michener and went on to state:
"It-is a matter of history that the Senate Judiciary Committee
was the drafting and driving force behind the Bill. The Bill had
extended consideration by a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee followed by weighty reports and full discussion on the
Senate floor. We are not pointed to a suggestion or a hint in the
Senate proceedings that the withdrawal of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes was subject to a latent exception as to
injunctions sought by the Government. The whole contemporaneous history is against it.•.. To find implications in the fact that in
the course of the debates it was not explicitly asserted that the district courts could not issue an injunction in a labor controversy
even at the behest of the Government is to find the silence of Congress more revealing than the natural meaning of legislation and
the history which begot it. The remarks of Mr. LaGuardia and
Mr. Michener ought not to be made the equivalent of writing an
amendment into the Act. It is one thing to draw on all relevant
aids for shedding light on the dark places of a statute. To allow .
inexplicit remarks in the giv.e-and-take of debate to contradict the
very terms of legislation and the history behind it is to put out the
controlling light on meaning shed by the explicit provisions of an
Act in its setting." 81]

II
THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING

The issues most immediately prese~ted by the pending appeal of
the contempt proceedings to the United States Supreme Court do not
lie as close to. our national -labor policy as those concerning the applicability of the Norris Act. However, they may be determinative of
the appeal, notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court consented to hear argument as .to the applicability of the Norris Act. 70
[

80

[ 81

Id., pp. 18-19.]
Id., pp. 12-13 of the opinion of Justice Frankfurter.]

70 94 N.Y. TrMES 1:1 (Dec. 17, 1946). It would seem likely that the importance
of the questions involved as to the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act would
result in a broader opinion than is strictly necessary.
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Consequently, the possible points of attack ·on the fines imposed in the
contempt proceeding challenge our attention. Before discussing these
points, a glance should be taken at the nature of the proceedingwhether civil, criminal, or both. In considering the possible grounds
for reversal ( that the original decree was improperly issued and could
therefore be ignored with impunity; that the fines imposed were excessive; and that the defendants were entitled to a jury trial) the nature of the proceeding and particularly its purpose-whether to vindicate the authority of the court or to further the civil interest of the
petitioner in the original cause-become highly significant.
[ With reference to the contempt proceedings and the fines imposed,
Chief Justice Vinson's majority opinion first considered the power of
the district court to entertain contempt proceedings ( even if it be assumed that the Norris Act were applicable to the case), and then turned
to various procedural questions, and the amount and character of the
fines imposed. Although the original comment does not follow the
same sequence, most of the questions considered by the Court are discussed therein and it lends itself readily to further analysis of the various opinions.]

A. The Civil-Criminal Contempt
In the course of the contempt proceeding, Judge Goldsborough observed to defense counsel, "If you know the exact difference between
a civil and a criminal contempt, you are the only person who does." 71
The line between civil and criminal contempt in injunction cases is indeed a tenuous one ( and, to make matters more confusing, forms of
procedure treated as a basis for determining whether the proceeding is
civil or criminal in one case may follow as a consequence of this determination in another).12 Judge Goldsborough resolved the question by
stating in open court before the hearings on the contempt citation began
that the defendants were charged with both civil and criminal contempt, 78 and his conclusions of law reiterated the ruling.74 An analysis
of the validity of this ruling is complicated by the fact that here one
plaintiff, the United States, was in a position to fire both barrels and
many of the tests for distinguishing will necessarily be indecisive. In
this situation, it is possible only to select some of the factors pointing in
one direction or the other and to recognize that ~y conclusions derived
therefrom can be little more than a guess.
71

94 N.Y. TIMES 2:2 (Nov. 30, 1946).
Moskovitz, "Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal," 43 CoL. L. REV.
780 at 786 (1943). And see 46 YALE L. J. 326 (1936).
78
Findings of fact, contempt proceeding, § 31. 19 L.R.R.M. 2079 (1946);
94 N.Y. TIMES 2:2 (Dec. 4, 1946).
74 Conclusions of law, contempt proceedings, §§ 6 and 7. Ibid.
72
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Factors indicating civil contempt are (I) that the contempt proceed- .
ing was heard as part of the original cause 75 whereas it has been held
that criminal contempts are to be prosecuted in a separate cause,76 and
( 2) that the fine imposed was intended, at least in part, to obtain compliance with the order. 77 On the other hand, it is true that the United
States prosecuted the contempt charges, which has frequently been
treated as a hallmark of criminal contempt,78 although it is clear that
the United States can be a party to civil contempt proceedings.79 Thus,
it seems unlikely that single elements can be selected which will be
determinative of the question. The motives of the government and the
court in pursuing the contempt charge were undoubtedly mixed; obtaining remedial compliance with the court's order was undoubtedly a
paramount consideration, but it is probably equally true that punishment for disrespect of the court's authority was a desired objective.
Perhaps the really important thing is that the defendants had notice of
the dual nature of the proceedings.so If this be so, then there is little
likelihood that the Supreme Court will upset the determination that
both civil and criminal contempt were involved. 81
75
The contempt proceedings were entitled in the original cause, No. 37764.
19 L.R.R.M. 2079 (1946).
76
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492 (19n);
Anargyros v. Anargyros & Co., (C.C. Cal. 1911) 191 F. 208; Norstrom v. Wahl,
(C.C.A. 7th, 1930) 41 F. (2d) 912; Parker v. United States, (C.C.A. 1st, 1946) 153
F. (2d) 66.
,
77 See statement of Assistant Attorney General John F. Sonnett to the Court.
.
94 N.Y. TIMES 2:3 (Dec. 5, 1946). These recommendations were adopted by the
court. That this is a factor indicating that the contempt proceeding was civil, see
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U,S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492 (19II); McCrone
v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 59 S. Ct. 685 (1939); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S.
33, 61 S. Ct. 810 (1940).
78 Anargyros v. Anargyros & Co., (C.C. Cal. 1911) 191 F. 208; Bradstreet Co. v.·
Bradstreet's Collection Bureau, (C.C.A. 2d, 1918) 249 F. 958; Nye v. United States,
313 U.S. 33, 61 S. Ct. 810 (1940).
79
McCrone v. United States. 307 U.S. 61, 59 S. Ct. 685 (1939).
so McCann v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, (C.C.A. 2d, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 2n; Western Fruit Growers v. Gottfried, (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) l 36 F. (2d) 98; United States
ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, (C.C.A. 7th, 1944) 140 F. (2d) 136. The rule to show
cause apparently did not specifically state that the defendants were charged with
criminal contempt, but Judg'e Goldsborough felt this defect to be insufficient to vitiate
the proceeding on the ground that the acts charged were criminal. See the court's oral
opinion on motion to discharge rule to show cause, 19 L.R.R.M. 2076 (1946); 94
N.Y. TIMES 2:2 (Nov. 30, 1946). A preferable ground would seem to be that the
defendants' had ample notice prior to the actual hearing of the contempt charges.
81 Admittedly, the same act may be both a civil and a criminal contempt, Bessette
v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 24 S. Ct. 665 (1904); Gompers v. Bucks Stove
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492 (1911) While some state courts have held
that the defendant may not be tried at one and the same time for both civil and
criminal contempt [Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 182 N.E. 313 (1932)], the
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[The Supreme Court majority dismissed summarily the defendant's contention that a civil contempt and a criminal contempt, although
arising out of the same circumstances, could not be tried in the same
proceeding:
"Even if it be the better practice to try criminal contempt alone
and to so avoid obscuring the defendant's privileges in any manner,
a mingling of civil and criminal contempt proceedings must nevertheless be shown to result in substantial prejudice before a reversal will be required. That the contempt proceeding carried the
number and name of the equity suit does not alter this conclusion,
especially where, as here, the United States would have been the
complaining party in whatever suit the contempt was tried. In so
far as the criminal nature of the double proceeding dominates and
in so far as the defendants' rights in the criminal trial are not diluted by the mixing of civil with criminal contempt, to that extent
is prejudice avoided." s2 ]
[ More detailed consideration was given to the requirement that
notice of the criminal character of a contempt proceeding be given to
the defendant, embodied in Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.33 The majority felt that the rule was adequately satisfied by actual notice to the defendants that the proceeding was both
civil and criminal in character. "Nevertheless, the defendants were
quite aware that a criminal contempt was charged. . . . Yet it is now
urged that the ommission of the words 'criminal contempt' from the
petition and rule to show cause was prejudicial error. Rule 42(b) requires no such rigorous application, for it was designed to insure a realization by contemnors that a prosecution for criminal contempt is
contemplated." 84 ]
[Justice Rutledge, with whom Justice Murphy joined, regarded
federal courts have not followed this line of reasoning. Matter of Christensen Engineering Co., 194 U.S. 458, 24 S. Ct. 729 (1904); In re Merchants' Stock & Grain
Co., 223 U.S. 639, 32 S. Ct. 339 (1912); Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107,
42 S. Ct. 427 (1922).
82

Adv. Op., pp. 38-39 of the opinion of the Court.]
18 U.S.C.A. (Supp., 1946), following § 687. The rule provides: ·«A criminal contempt •.. shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state ... the essential
facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and shall describe it as such." In note
66 of the opinion of the Court, it is said: "The rule in this respect (insuring a realization of the contemnors that a prosecution for criminal contempt is contemplated) follows the suggestion made in McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, So F. {2d) 2u,
214-215 (1935). Notes to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Advisory Committee,
March 1945, p. 34."]
84
[
Adv. Op., p. 36 of the opinion of the Court.]
[

[
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the mingling of the civil and criminal aspects of the contempt proceeding as incompatible with Constitutional guaranties:
"In any other context than one of contempt, the idea that a
criminal prosecution and a civil suit for damages or equitable relief
could be hashed together in a single criminal-civil hodgepodge
would be shocking to every American lawyer and to most citizens.
'True, the same act may give rise to all these varied legal consequences. But we have never adopted, rather our Constitution has
totally rejected the continental system of compounding criminal
proceedings with civil adjudications." 85 ]
[With specific reference to the question of notice, Jusfrce Rutledge
regarded it as material that the defendant ought to be able to determine
"by a mere inspection of the papers in the contempt proceedings"
whether they are civil or criminal. in character.36 ]

B. Possible Points of Attack on the Contempt Fines
I.

The contempt power of the court

The power of the district court to punish for contempt of its
temporary restraining order is defined by the statutory provision that
inferior courts of the United States "shall have power ... to punish,
by :fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of
their authority. Such power to. punish contempts shall not be construed to extend to any cases except •.. the disobedience or resistance
•.• by any party ... to any lawful ... order, rule, decree or command
of the said courts." 82 The contempt proceeding in the Mine Workers
case :fits squarely under this language, leaving open only the question
as to what is meant by a "lawful" order or'command. Absent the questions pos~d by the Norris Act, even though the temporary restraining
order issued by Judge Goldsborough might be determined to be erroneous on direct appeal, it could not be attacked collaterally in the
contempt proceedings.88 However, the Norris Act purports to limit the
[ 85

Id., pp. 22-23 of the opinion of Justice Rutledge.]
Id., pp. 30-32. The languag~ quoted comes from Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 at 446, 31 S. Ct. 492 (1911).]
(

86

82
36 Stat. L. 1163, c 231, § 268 (1911), 28 U.S.C. (1940) § 385. Whether
this statute is merely declaratory of a power iµhererit in the judicial function or whether
it limits such a pre-existing power is not entirely clear. [See notes 12, 21, 22 and 23
to 28 U.S.C.A. (1928) § 385]. However, this question is not material to the Mine
Workers case since the contempt for which fines were imposed is clearly within the
statutory language.
88
Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 42 S. Ct. 277 (1922). There the Supreme
Court ruled that even though an injunction was based on an unconstitutional statute,
it could not be attacked in a contempt proceeding.

1 947

J

COMMENTS

499

"jurisdiction" of inferior courts of the United States to issue labor injunctions. If the Norris Act should be ruled applicable to the case, the
question then arises whether injunctions issued contrary to the act may
be the basis for contempt proceedings.
It has often been asserted that it is not contempt to disobey an order
issued without jurisdiction of the subject matter,84 but modern decisions,
relying on the principle of res judicata, have tended to restrict this
doctrine to clear cases of usurpation of power to adjudicate the subject
matter. Thus it has been held that the decision of a court of general
jurisdiction that it lias jurisdiction is conclusive on the parties unless
and until it is set aside upon direct attack. 8G The Norris Act clearly
contemplates that the inferior federal courts shall retain jurisdiction to
issue injunctions in labor disputes, providing that the procedural prerequisites established therein are satisfied and the injunction does not
prohibit any one or more of the acts specified in section 4; thus, a strong
case can be made that "jurisdiction" as used in the act does not in any
event mean powt#' to adjudicate the subject matter. In each case where
the defendants seek the protection of the Norris Act the court must
decide whether a labor dispute is invqlved and, if so, whether the procedural prerequisites have been satisfied. Its decision is probably determinative of its own jurisdiction, subject to review on appeal. 88
The civil-criminal contempt distinction must, however, still be
reckoned with. Certainly, the Gompers case 87 provides a basis for
84
In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 S. Ct. 482 (1888); Ex parte Rowland, 104
U.S. 604 (1881); Ex parte Fisk, II3 U.S. 712, 5 S. Ct. 724 (!'885); Beauchamp v.
United States, (C.C.A. 9th, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 663; Western Fruit Growers v. Gotfried, (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 98.
SG United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 27 S. Ct. 165 (1906); Toy Toy v.
United States, 212 U.S. 542, 29 S. Ct. 416 (1909); Merrimack River Savings Bank v.
Clay Center, 219 U.S. 527, ·31 S. Ct. 295 (19n); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181,
42 S. Ct. 277 (1922). See, also, Carter v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 135 F.
(2d) 858, involving the claim that the Norris Act established federal jurisdiction.
The extent to which the doctrine has been carried is indicated in Stoll v.
Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 S. Ct. 134 (1938); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308
U.S. 66, 601 S. Ct. 44 (1939); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381 at 403, 60 S. Ct. 907 (1940), and Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct.317 (1940). See, on this general proposition, 53 HARV.
L. REv. 652 (1940) and 49 YALE L. J. 959 (1940).
88
We find no federal cases directly involving this question under the Norris Act.
The decisions in state courts involving similar statutes have gone both ways. Reid v.
Union of All Workers, 200 Minn. 599, 275 N.W. 300 (1937), accord; People ex
rel. Sandnes v. Sheriff of King's County, 164 Misc. 335, 299 N.Y.S. 9 (1937),
contra. The constitutional objection to a treatment of state statutes as strictly jurisdictional does not apply to the Norris Act. See McClintock, "The Minnesota Labor
Disputes Injunction Act," 21 MINN. L. REv. 432 (1941).
87
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S. Ct. 492 (19n).
In that case the defendants were convicted by a lower federal court of contempt in
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arguing that, if the civil complainant is not entitled to his civil contempt
sanction after settlement of the main proceeding, he is no more entitled
to it when the injunction ought never to have been issued.88 But even if
this be so, the United States would be entitled to the contempt proceedings in its role as prosecutor of a criminal contempt. Conceivably, the
Supreme-Court might reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to isolate the criminal factors in a new trial.
[ Chief Justice Vinson, having discussed United States v. Shipp and
Carter v. United States, 37 stated:
"In the case be~ore us, the District Court had the power to
preserve existing conditions while it was determining its own authority to grant injunctive relief. The defendants, in making their
private determination of the law, acted at their peril. Their disobedience is punishable as criminal contempt." 38
And,
·
"Proceeding furt4er, we find impressive authority for the
proposition that an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over
the subject matter and persons must be obeyed by the parties until
it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings .... Violations of
an order are punishable as criminal contempt even though the
order is set aside on appeal, Worden v. Searls, 121 U.S. 14
(1887), or though the basic action has become moot, Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (19u)." 59
However, the Chief Justive werit on to state that
" ... the right to remedial relief falls with an injunction which
events prove was erroneously issued ... ; and a fortiori when the
injunction or restraining order was beyond the jurisdiction of the
court.40
"Assuming, then, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied to
this case and prohibited injunctive relief at the request of the
United States, we would set aside the preliminary injunction of
December 4 and the judgment for civil contempt; but we would,
violating a labor injunction. All matters in controversy in the original suit in which
the injunction was issued were settled pending appeal of the contempt conviction.
Holding that the contempt proceeding in the lower court was a civil proceeding, part
of the original cause, and therefore ended when the main ca_use was settled, the Supreme
Court ordered the contempt proceeding dismissed.
88
Carter v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 858; Western Fruit
Growers v. Gotfried, (C.C.A. 9th, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 98.
87

United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 27 S. Ct. 165 (1906); Carter v.
United States, (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 858.]
38
[
Adv. Op., p. 31 of the opin_ion of the Court.]
39
[
Id., PP· 32-33.]
40
[
Id., p. 33.]
[
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subject to any infirmities in the contempt proceedings or in the
fines imposed, affirm the judgments for criminal contempt as
validly punishing an order then outstanding and unreversed." 41 ]
. pustice Frankfurter concurred with this phase of the majority
op1mon:
"Short of an indisputable want of authority on the part of a
court, the very existence of a court presupposes its power to entertain a controversy, if only to decide, after deliberation, that it has
no power over the particular controversy...• And if the district
court had power to decide whether this case was properly before
it, it could make appropriate orders so as to a:fford the necessary
time for fair consideration and decision while existing conditions
were preserved." 42 ]
[Justices Black and Douglas regarded it as unnecessary to decide
the question, since they had concurred that. the Norris Act was inapplicable to the case.4 8 Justices Murphy and Rutledge each dissented
from the majority opinion in this connection. Justice Murphy stated:
"Congress was well aware of this use of restraining orders to
break strikes. After full consideration, it intentionally and specifically prohibited their use, with certain exceptions not here relevant.
We are not free to disregard that prohibition. . . . If we are to
hold these defendants in contempt for having violated a void restraining order, we must close our eyes to the expressed will of
Congress and to the whole history of equitable restraints in the
field of labor disputes. We must disregard the fact that to compel
one to obey a void restraining order in a case involving a labor
dispute and to require that it be tested on appeal is to sanction the
use of the restraining order to break strikes-which was precisely
Id., p. 34.]
ld., p. 4 of the opinion of Justice Frankfurter. The majority opinion does
not clearly indicate whether the word "jurisdiction" in the Norris Act was considered
to mean power or whether merely that proceedings within the act which did not comply
with it are erroneous, unless it can be said that the words, "and a fortiori when the
injunction or restraining order was beyond the jurisdiction of the court" (id., p. 34 of
the opinion of the Court), which would otherwise seem to be superfluous, suggest the
former. However, Justice Frankfurter's language indicates that he may have regarded
the word "jurisdiction" in the Norris Act as the equivalent of power.]
48
[
Id., p. 4 of the opinion of Justice Black and Justice Douglas. It is clear that
the judgments could not have been sustained in exactly the same form had this line of
reasoning been the one upon which the majority rested its decision; the fine imposed
for civil contempt would have had to be vacated completely. It might be argued on
this basis that the majority statements on the question are dicta. Obviously, Justice
Frankfurter's comments are essential to his opinion.]
(41
42
[
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what Congress wanted to avoid. Every reason supporting the
salutary principle of the Shipp case breaks down when that principle is applied in this setting." 44 ]
. [Justice Rutledge, with whom Justice Murphy joined, dissected
the Shipp case and concluded that it was not apposite to the Mine
Workers case:
"The Court in Shipp was dealing with a situation quite different from the ones presented in the previous decisions and in this
case. In none of them was the action which violated the court's
order such as would have defeated its jurisdiction not only to enter
the order but also to proceed with the cause before it in any manner, except to deal with the matter of contempt.4"
"Since in my opinion the order was jurisdictionally invalid
when issued, by virtue of the War Labor Disputes Act and its
adoption of the Norris-LaGuardia Act's policy, it follows that the
violation gave no suffici~nt cause for sustaining the conviction for
contempt.... Lewis and the United Mine Workers necessarily
took the risk that the order would be found valid on review and, in
that event, that punishment for contempt would apply. They did
not take the risk that it would apply in any event, even if the order
should be found void as beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to
enter." 46 ] •

The amount of the fines
Apart from the Constitutional prohibition of excessive fines, 89 the
punishment imposed for contempt is limited only by the sound discretion of the court; the abuse of discretion is, of course, subject to re.:.
view.90 The fine .impo~ed against the union in the principal case,
$3,500,000, appears to be the largest ever assessed in any contempt
proceeding in this country.91 If it and the $10,000 fine against Lewis
2.

I

[ 44

Id., p. 7 of the opinion of Justice Murphy.]
[~Adv.Op., p. 16 of the opinion of Justice Rutledge.]
46
[
Id., p. 21.]
89

Eighth Amendment, Constitution of the United States.
Brooks v. United States, (C.C.A. 9th, 1941) n9 F. (2d) 636; Warring v.
Huff, (App. D.C. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 641, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678, 62 S. Ct..
183 (1941); United States ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, (C.C.A. 7th, 1944) 140 F. (2d)
136; Huffman v. United States, (C.C.A. 10th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 943; Moore v.
United States, (C.C.A. 10th, 1945) 150 F. (2d) 323, cert. denied 326 U.S. 740,
66 S. Ct. 52 (1945).
91
94 N.Y. TIMES 5:1 (Dec. 5, 1946). This amount has been exceeded outside
of contempt proceedings. In I 908, the Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, convicted of
receiving freight rebates in violation of the Elkins Act, was fined $29,240,000, computed by imposing the maximum fine authorized under the act, $20,000, for each car90
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were imposed to enforce the civil rights of the government under the
Krug-Lewis agreement by coercing the defendants into withdrawing
their notice of termination, the amounts might be justified. Huge sums
of money were at stake, requiring a sizeable financial weapon to compel
action. 02 However, if the fines are considered as criminal penalties, it is
possible to suggest more definite standards by which they may be
measured.
There are two statutes which may be relevant. Except where the
United States is the complainant, the punishments which an inferior
federal court may impose against a natural person for contempts which
are also violations of criminal statutes ( e.g., the War Labor Disputes
Act) are limited by statute to a $ r ,ooo fine or six months imprisonment.98 In Ryals v. United States, decided by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court observed that, in punishing
contempts not included within this statute, "great weight" should be
given to the limits therein imposed.94 The other statute which may be
relevant is the Smith-Connally Act; there is an obvious disparity between the $5,ooo fine authorized by that act for striking or inducing a
strike against the government and the fines levied for a contempt involving substantially the same action.95 Even though it be conceded
that a court, in punishing an act which simultaneously violates a criminal statute and is in contempt of an order of that court, is not limited
to the maximum penalty authorized by the statute,96 the qt,1estion reload of oil shipped under the rebate scheme. The fine would have forced the nominal defendant into bankruptcy, but could have been paid by Standard Oil of New
Jersey, -which held the stock of defendant and was regarded by the trial court as the
real defendant. The trial court was held on appeal to have abused its discretion in
imposing a fine for each car shipped, and in financially destroying the defendant in an
effort to punish the holding company, not before the court. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. United States, (C.C.A. 7th, 1908) 164 F. 376.
92 How large the financial weapon might be involves imponderables for which no
satisfactory measure. can be suggested. It has been said that size alone will not make
the fine arbitrary. [Moore v. United States, (C.C.A. rnth, 1945) 150 F. (2d) 323]
and it is unlikely that the compensatory aspects of the fine will be emphasized since
actual loss or postponement of revenues to the government was more prospective than
realized. In this situation, the court might well follow the reasoning of the Moore
case which considered the inability to pay or taking of the substantial part of the defendant's assets would be indicative that the fine was excessive. Neither of these factors
appears to be present in the principal case.
98
38 Stat. L. 738, § 22 (1914), 28 U.S.C. (1940) § 387. See 34 Mica. L.
REV. 123 (1935).
94
(C.C.A. 5th, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 946. But see Hill v. United States ex rel.
Weiner, 300 U.S. 105, 57 S. Ct. 347 (1937).
95
57 Stat. L. 163 at 165, § 6 (1943), 50 U.S.C. (Supp. 1941-46) Appx.,
§ 1506(b).
96
Little state or federal authority has been uncovered on this point, but perhaps
the following will suffice: United States ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, (C.C.A. 7th, 1944)
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mains whether the bounds of discretion are not exceeded when the disparity is so great.97
[ Chief Justice Vinson adopted the Gompers case reasoning that sentences for criminal contempt are punitive and are imposed for the
purpose of vindicating the authority of the court, whereas judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may be employed for either or both
of two purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the
court's order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.
He also outlined the standards by which fines imposed for these various
purposes are to be assessed: for criminal contempt, "the trial judge
may properly take into consideration the extent of the wilfull and deliberate defiance of the court's order, the seriousness of the consequences of the contumacious behavior, the necessity of effectively
terminating the defendant's defiance as required by the public interest, ,
and the importance of deterring such acts in the future"; 47 for the compensatory aspects of relief granted in a civil contempt, the fine, payable
to the complainant, "must of course be based upon evidence of complainant's actual loss"; 48 for the coercive aspect of relief granted in civil
contel!lpt, the court must "consider the character and magnitude of the
harm, threatened by- continued contumacy, and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired." 49 ]
[The Chief Justice then stated: "In the light of these principles,
we think the record clearly warrants a fine of $ro,ooo against defendant Lewis for criminal contempt. A majority of the Court, however,
does not think that it warrants the unconditional imposition of a fine
of $3,500,000 against the defendant union. A majority feels that, if
the court below had assessed a fine of $700,000 against the defendant
union, this; under the circumstances, would not be excessive as punishment for the criminal contempt theretofore committed. . . ." ~0 On
140 F. (2d) 136; Moore v. United States, (C.C.A. 10th, 1945) 150 F. (2d) 323;
People ex rel. Rusch v. Montesano, 293 Ill. App. 630, 12 N.E. (2d) 915 (1938);
Stern v. Rogers, 311 Ill. App. 654, 37 N.E. (2d) 568 (1941). It has been suggested
that the power of a constitutionally created state court to punish for contempt cannot be
limited by the state legislature, the theory being that such power is inherent in the
courts and essential to the proper exercise of their functions. Crook v. Schull_lann, 292
Ky. 750, 167 S.W. (2d) 836 (1942). It is not denied that Congress can restrict the
power of inferior federal courts to punish for contempt, but it is unlikely that any such
restriction will be recognized by implication.
97
That the contempt fine was less than the statutory criminal penalty was taken
to be an indication of reasonableness in Moore v. United States, (C.C.A. 10th, 1945)
150 F. (2d) 323.
(

47

Adv. Op., p. 41 of the opinion of the Court.]

[4s Id., p. 42.]
[

49

Id., pp. 42-43.]

[50 Id., p. 43.]
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this point, Justices Black and Douglas, who had hitherto concurred with
the majority on the most crucial points, dissented; the majority was
maintained by Justice Frankfurter who "join [ ed] in the opinion of the
Court in so far as it sustains the judgment for criminal contempt upon
the broad ground of vindicating the process of law." 51 ]
[The Chief Justice then went on:" ... and [a majority] feels that,
in order to coerce the defendant union into a future compliance with ,
the court's order, it would have been effective to make the other $2,800,000 of the fine conditional on the defendant's failure to purge itself within a reasonable time." 52 Compurgation was stated to require
"full compliance [ with the District Court's temporary restraining
order] by withdrawing unconditionally the notice given by it, ... terminating the Krug-Lewis agreement ... and by notifying, at the same
time, its members of such withdrawal. ..." 53 The majority on this
point was maintained by Justices Black and Douglas.]
[Justice Rutledge, with whom Justice Murphy joined, levelled a
comprehensive critique at this treatment of the fines imposed by the
district court:
"Obviously, however, when all these distinct types and functions of relief are lumped together, in a single so-called 'fine,'
none of the long established bases for measurement can be applied,
for there is nothing to which they can apply. We can only speculate upon what portion of each 'fine' may have been laid to compensate for damages, what for punishment, and what, if any, for
civil coercion.... In this state of things, it is utterly impossible to
perform our function of review in the manner heretofore required,
even within the broad limits prescribed for cases of civil and criminal contempt. This commingling of the various forms of relief,
like that of the proceedings themselves, deprives these contemnors
of any possibility for having the scope of the relief against them
measured according to law." 54 ]
[ As to the Court's revision of the fines, Justice Rutledge was
equally insistent that there was error. "The Court seemingly recognizes this [ that the lumping of the various aspects of the contempt in
one fine is improper], in part, in the revision it makes of the District
51

Id., p. 5 of the opinion of Justice Frankfurter.]
Id., p. 43 of the opinion of the Court. Neither the fines levied absolutely
nor the conditional fine assessed against the union appear to have been regarded as compensatory in any part. As stated by Justice Rutledge, "Any award for civil damages
allegedly sustained apparently is eliminated." Id., p. 41 of the opinion of Justice
Rutledge.]
58
(
Id., pp. 43-44 of the opinion of the Court.]
5
[ 4ld., pp. 37-39 of the opinion of Justice Rutledge.]
(

[

52
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Court's penalties .••• The Court .•. purports to make separate the distinct items of relief commingled in the District Court's action. But in
doing so, in my opinion, it wholly disregards the established standard
for measuring criminal fines and its own as well as the District Court's
function relating to them." 55 Justice Rutledge then went on to point
out that the $5,000 criminal penalty fixed for violation of the SmithConnally Act should fix the maximum fine for the criminal contempts
involved in the case, and that, in any event, it was the district court's
function to fix the amounts of the fines imposed for criminal contempt.]
[Justices Black and Douglas concurred with Justice Rutledge in his
view that the fines for criminal contempt, even as modified by the
Court, were excessive. However, they regarded criminal sanctions as
inappropriate to the proceedings in any event:
"At a very early date this Court declared, and recently it has
reiterated, that in contempt proceedings courts should never exercise more than 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' ... The impositi9n of criminal punishment here was an
exercise of far more than 'the least possible power adequate to the
end proposed.' For here the great and legitimate 'end proposed'
was affirmative action by the defendants to prevent interruption
of coal production pending final adjudication of the controversy." ~6 ]
Moreover, Justices Black and Douglas regarded· the question of
defendants' intent as relevant; although their conduct was wilful it
appeared to have been founded upon the belief, in good faith, that they
were acting within their rights. Accordingly, Justices Black and
Douglas would have made the entire amount of the fine imposed by
the district court payable conditionally upon the defendants' failure to
purge themselves of the contempt.]

3. The right to jury_ trial
If the Norris Act is applicable, a question is raised as to the defendants' right to jury trial under section r r. 98 The jury trial provision of
the Clayton Act was construed to apply only to criminal contempt
proceedings because it was limited to those contempts which were also
violations of criminal statutes, and because the same section also required that the trial conform, as nearly as possible, to practice in criminal cases.99 But section rr of the Norris Act does not have either of
[

55

[ 56

9~

Id., pp. 40-41.]
.
Id., p. 6 of the opinion of Justices Black and Douglas.]

29 U.S.C. (1940) § III.
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 45 S. ·Ct. 18 (1924). Sustaining the
constitutionality of the act, the court limited its ruling to criminal contempt proceed99
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these· features. It provides for jury trial in all cases arising under the
act in which a person shall be charged with contempt, with two exceptions not relevant in this case. It can hardly be argued that the defendants have waived their right to jury trial by waiving an advisory
jury 100 and the contempt appeal is the only appropriate proceeding to
raise this question. That being so, the possibility that the case may be
remanded for a jury trial, remote in importance as it may seem at this
stage of proceedings, should not be overlooked.
[Chief Justice Vinson's opinion ruled that the defendants were
properly tried by the court without a jury, a conclusion which followed
from the decision that the Norris Act did not apply to the case. 57 However, the Chief Justice indicated that the ruling might have been otherwise if the Norris Act applied to the case.58 ]

III
CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY

Dispassionate analysis of the legal questions involved in the principal
case should not obscure the fact that Judge Goldsborough was faced
with the existence of a situation in which (I) the action of the defendants had been taken in clear disregard of the public interest, and the
nation was face to face with an economic breakdown and imminent
danger to public health and welfare unless the coal strike should be terminated without substantial delay, (2) the legislative policy as to the
legality of the strike was clear-it was illegal, (3) the immediate dispute was concerning a question of contract construction, a type of dispute which, by accepted principles of sound labor relations, should not
giv~ rise to work stoppages, and ( 4) the executive arm of the government, which bears primary responsibility for the public safety in times
of emergency, was asking the court for assistance. These facts could not
have failed to influence the judge in his decision. The result was to
add the force of a judicial decree to the pressures of public opinion,
ings, the only question then before it, but it seems most unlikely that the court will
hold Congress cannot require jury trial in a civil contempt proceeding. The strict
argument against jury trial rests on the need of the judiciary for independence and
power to maintain its authority, an argument peculiarly pertinent to the criminal proceeding.
10
°Findings of fact, contempt proceedings, 19 L.R.R.M. 2079 (1946); 94 N.Y.
TIMES 2:2 (Dec. 4, 1946).
51

'

Adv. Op., pp. 36-37 of the opinion of the Court.]
[
"We believe, and the Government admits, that the defendants would have
been entitled to a jury trial if § 1 I applied to the instant contempt proceeding and if
this case arose under the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Adv. Op., footnote 69 to the opinion
of the Court. Compare footnote 2 to the opinion of Justice Frankfurter and footnote
34 to the opinion of Justice Rutledge.]
[

58

•
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John L. Lewis yielded, and the immediate threat to public safety and
welfare was removed. This was not the first time that judicial action
had responded to impelling considerations of public need, and it is, safe
to assume that it will not be the last.
The Supreme Court, as a result of the union chieftain's decision to
bow to the pressures put upon him, can now consider the legal questions
involved in an atmosphere freed of the tension which was present while
the strike was still on. It can now decide, more easily than it could have
otherwise, that Congress did in the Norris act strip its courts even of
the power to aid the government in distress. Or it can read into the act
a general exception in favor of the government, or a limited exception
which would exist only in a case like that at bar----where the government in the public interest has taken possession of private property for
the purpose of enforcing a temporary truce between the warring parties.
In any case it can approve the meting out of some kind of penaltyalbeit perhaps reduced-against defendants for their contempt. Whatever decision the Court makes on the Norris Act question, it can be
made with knowledge of the fact that the eightieth Congress, now sitting, is in position without delay to make any revision in the law which
it considers desirable. ·
[ The Supreme Court decision does not affect all cases in which the
government seeks injunctive relief in a case involving a labor dispute;
only if the labor dispute is between the government and its bone fide
employees or between the government and workers in a government
seized plant or facility is the Norris Act inapplicable. As suggested by
Chief Justice Vinson, the primary reliance of the federal government in
labor disputes with its employees ( using the word in its traditional
sense) must be "on all federal civil and military forces. If these failed,
a federal injunction would be a meaningless form." 59 And, in relation
to workers in otherwise private plants or facilities which have been
seized by the government, the immediate implications of the decision as
to the Norris Act are minimized by the fact that the war-born SmithConnally Act will expire on June 30, r947 by reason of its own terms
and the Presidential proclamation of the end of hostilities unless Congress extends the act or enacts similar legislation.]
The principal case has therefore become most important now in its
bearing on the legislative problem with respect to labor relations which
is before Congress. The national labor policy, which began with the
railway labor legislation, continued in the Norris Act and culminated
in the National Labor Relations Act, was born of a desire to provide
workers, through self-organization, with an effective means of meeting
the employer's economic power on something like equal terms. -It was
[

59

Id., p. I 5 of the opinion of the Court.]
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hoped that there would ensue a general improvement in our economic
life as economic democracy achieved the level of political democracy.
In the intervening years, organized labor has prospered. Industrywide unionism prevails in most of the nation's basic industries and with
it industry-wide bargaining has developed. The strength of unionism
and the interdependence of industry units is such that a failure of the
processes of collective bargaining-as in the case of the mines, steel,
automobiles, oil-_-acutely and immediately involves the general public
interest as, indeed, does price or other action by industrial groups,
though less spectacularly. The great question which the government
and the people now face is how to safeguard this interest without seriously undermining free collective bargaining.
Certainly it does not follow that a blanket exception of government
suits need be written into the Norris Act to safeguard adequately the
public interest. The public interest would suffer not at all from a compliance with the procedural requisites of the act. The most that would
seem to be demanded would be an exception to section 4, providing that
the right to strike or to induce a strike is not absolute when the government appears as petitioner and the court finds that the public interest
is affected. Yet even under these circumstances an injunction against
strike action after the mediation process has been exhausted does not
resolve the issues raised by the dispute; the injunction deprives labor
of its strongest, and often in reality its only, means of enforcing its demands. An equitable settlement of the controversy would then seem to
require that the government take an active part in the bargaining process, as it does under the railway labor legislation. The specific devices
developed in respect to the railway industry, such as active mediation
boards, encouragement of arbitration, and emergency boards of investigation appointed by the President and aided by a waiting period during
the investigation, might suffice to settle· even such a labor dispute as
that involved in the principal case. However, revival of the labor injunction in the federal courts ( even on a limited basis) should not be
undertaken without a full realization that, failing in mediation, failing
to obtain arbitration, and failing to achieve settlement of disputes by
emergency investigation and fact finding, use of the injunction might
force the government to assume the role of final arbiter, a result contrary to our national labor policy as hitherto conceived.
[The effect given to the Smith-Connally Act in the Supreme Court
decision may raise the question whether the device of government seizure might not be employed as a peace time measure to insure industrial peace. Apart from serious Constitutional questions and the argument that seizure is in effect temporary nationalization, three observations are in order: first, government seizure implies that the government itself will set the terms and conditions of employment during the
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period of government possession; second, the terms and conditions of
employment established for the period of government possession may
prove to be the minimum from which negotiations between the private
parties in interest can proceed when government possession is terminated; and third, government seizure may present no greater guarantee
than other less drastic measures that the private parties in interest will
be able to resolve the issues in the disputes by free collective bargaining.]
R. L. Cardon,
R. 0. Hancox, S.Ed.
P. F. Westbrook, Jr., S.Ed.

